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Introduction
One of the most important questions of philosophy of mathematics is the on-
tological status of mathematical entities. In the late 70s, Quine and Putnam
suggested an argument for the existence of mathematical entities. The argu-
ment is based on the idea that mathematics is not only applicable but in fact
indispensable to empirical sciences; and if so, then mathematical entities are as
indispensable from our best ontological picture of the world as electrons and
other physical entities, to the existence of which physicists are committed.
In it’s most explicit form the argument reads as follows.
Indispensability argument
(P1) We ought to have ontological commitment to all and only the entities
that are indispensable to our best scientific theories.
(P2) Mathematical entities are indispensable to our best scientific theo-
ries.
(C) We ought to have ontological commitment to mathematical entities.
The argument has attracted a great deal of attention. Many platonists regard it
as the best available argument for the existence of mathematical entities. The
opponents of the argument objected, first of all, to the first premise; while the
second premise was considered uncontroversial (Colyvan 2004).
What does the first premise exactly mean? First of all, it definitely pre-
supposes a kind of naturalism. For, naturalism claims that we have to have
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ontological commitment to all and only the entities that exist according to our
best scientific theories. According to Quine (1961, 1981), if the language of
the scientific theory quantifies over some entities which are, at the same time,
indispensable, then we ought to have ontological commitment to those entities.
It is therefore necessary to clarify the proper meaning of “indispensability”.
It would be quite obvious to interpret dispensability as eliminability. An
entity is eliminable from a theory if there is another theory which is empirically
equivalent to the original one, but does not quantify over the entity in question.
In this case, however, every non-observable entity would be dispensable, due
to the well known Craig theorem (1953). In other words, we would have to
reject the existence of anything but the directly observable entities. In order to
avoid such a radical conclusion, many suggest, we need to prescribe some further
requirements for the new theory. These requirements are usually the following:
clarity, simplicity, unificatory power, generality and fecundity (Burgess 1983,
Maddy 2005). These requirements altogether are called attractivity. So, an
entity is dispensable if it is eliminable and the theory we obtain by its elimination
remains attractive. In any event, the notion of attractivity is quite ambiguous;
and it is hard to believe that the most fundamental ontological questions depend
on such unclear and sociologically relative notions.
On the other hand, the second premise was considered as an evident one.
Hartry Field was the first who claimed that the second premise is, in fact, false;
mathematical entities are not indispensable to our best scientific theories. Field
adopted Quine’s linguistic criterion that a scientific theory asserts the existence
of an entity by quantifying over the entity in question. He also accepted the
attractivity requirements. But he had shown that a physical theory can always
be “nominalized”, by which he means that it can be reconstructed such that
(1) the new theory does not contain quantifications over mathematical entities,
however, (2) remains attractive.
The nominalization procedure
In his Science Without Numbers (1980), Field showed, as an example, how can
a fragment of Newtonian gravitational theory be nominalized. On the next
few pages I will reconstruct Field’s nominalization procedure in the case of an
even more simple “toy” physical theory. My purpose is not only to demonstrate
the nominalization steps in a perhaps more clear-cut example, but also to lay
the emphasis on different points. First, within a physical theory, we will make
a clear separation of the formal system and the semantics. Second, we will
keep it clear that the equivalence of physical theories is understood as empirical
equivalence (Fig. 1).
The nominalization procedure consists of the following three steps:
(1) We have a body of physical facts, in terms of empirical observations.
(2) We have the usual platonistic physical theory describing the observable
phenomena in question – containing quantifications over mathematical
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entities. The platonistic theory will consist of a formal system L, and a
semantics S.
(3) We construct a new theory which is capable to describe the same phenom-
ena, but without quantifications over mathematical entities. The nomi-
nalized theory will consist of a formal system L′, and a semantics S′.
We will show the equivalence of these theories on the level of observable
phenomena.
formal system with quantification
over non−physical terms
formal system without quantification
over non−physical terms
observable phenomena
Figure 1: The platonistic physical theory and the nominalized physical theory
should be equivalent on the empirical level.
The ”toy” physical theory
The “toy” physical theory is about a few empirically observable regularities
related with the spatial relations of properties of the material points/molecules
of a sheet of paper. Thus, the only physical entities are the molecules of the
paper and the only measuring equipment will be a scale-free ruler. We will
examine – empirically – the following two properties of the molecules:
Betweenness We say that molecule γ is between molecules α and β if when-
ever the ruler fits to α and β then it also fits to γ and the mark on the ruler
corresponding to γ falls between the marks corresponding to α and β.
Congruence We will say that a pair of molecules α, β is congruent to a pair
of molecules γ, δ if whenever we mark the ruler at α, β, the same marks will also
fit to γ, δ.
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With our scale-free ruler we can observe the following empirical facts about the
molecules of the paper:
(E1) If molecules α and β are congruent to molecules γ and δ, and γ and δ are
congruent to molecules ε and ζ, then α and β are congruent to ε and ζ.
(E2) If we consider three molecules fitting to the ruler, then there is exactly
one that lies between the other two.
The usual platonistic physical theory of the paper
We present a “platonistic” physical theory (L, S) which describes the empirical
facts of the paper. The formal system of the physical theory will be L =(
R2,Γ,Λ
)
, where
Γ(a, b, c) is a relation between three points of R2 (six real numbers):
Γ(a, b, c) ⇐⇒
√
(a1 − b1)2 + (a2 − b2)2 +
√
(c1 − b1)2 + (c2 − b2)2
=
√
(a1 − c1)2 + (a2 − c2)2
Λ(a, b, c, d) is a relation between four points of R2 (eight real numbers):
Λ(a, b, c, d) ⇐⇒
√
(a1 − b1)2 + (a2 − b2)2 =
√
(c1 − d1)2 + (c2 − d2)2
The semantics S is defined as follows: First, to every molecule we assign an
element of R2: α corresponds to a = (a1, a2) ∈ R2, β to b = (b1, b2) ∈ R2, and
so on. Second, relation Γ corresponds to the Betweenness and Λ corresponds
to the Congruence of the molecules. All this representation is carefully made
such that the physical theory (L, S), that is, the formal system
(
R2,Γ,Λ
)
with
the above semantics provides a proper description of our empirical knowledge
about the paper. It means that if Γ(a, b, c) is true for a, b, c ∈ R2 then it is true
for the corresponding molecules α, β and γ that molecule β is between α and γ.
Similarly, if Λ(a, b, c, d) is true for a, b, c, d ∈ R2 then it is true that molecules
α, β are congruent with molecules γ, δ.
For example, empirical facts (E1) and (E2) are obviously represented in the
theory (L, S). Moreover, (L, S) has predictive power. For instance, in
(
R2,Γ,Λ
)
we can prove the following theorem (Fig. 2):
Theorem 1.
∀a∀b∀g∀d∀e∀z∃o Γ(a, d, b) ∧ Γ(b, e, g) ∧ Γ(g, z, a)
∧Λ(a, d, d, b) ∧ Λ(b, e, e, g) ∧ Λ(g, z, z, a)
→ Γ(a, o, e) ∧ Γ(b, o, z) ∧ Γ(g, o, d)
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Figure 2: The centroid of a triangle always exists.
With the above semantics, this leads us to the following hypothesis about the
molecules of the paper (Fig. 3):
HYPOTHESIS If molecules α, β, γ, δ, ε and ζ satisfy that δ is between α
and β, ε is between β and γ, and ζ is between γ and α, furthermore, α, δ are
congruent to δ, β, and β, ε are congruent to ε, γ, and γ, ζ are congruent to ζ, α,
then we can always find a molecule ω such that it is between α and ε, and it is
between β and ζ and it is between γ and δ.
β
γ
ε
ω
ζ
α
δ
Figure 3: According to the semantics of the theory, Theorem 1. (Fig. 2) is a
statement about the molecules of the paper.
This hypothesis can be verified empirically by means of the scale-free ruler; and
we will find that the hypothesis is true.
In Field’s terminology, (L, S) is a platonistic theory: It contains quantifica-
tions over mathematical entities, namely, over real numbers, since Γ and Λ are
relations between real numbers.
The nominalized theory
Now we will construct another physical theory which can equally well describe
the same observable phenomena but without quantifications over mathematical
entities. This will consist of another formal system L′ with another semantics
S′.
The formal language L′ will be a first order formal system. L′ will contain
individuum variables A,B,C, . . . and a three-argument predicate symbol Bet
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and a four-argument predicate symbol Cong. Beyond the logical axioms of
PC(=) (predicate calculus with identity) we will need the following “physical”
axioms:1
T1 ∀A∀B Cong(A,B,B,A)
T2 ∀A∀B∀C Cong(A,B,C,C)→ A = B
T3 ∀A∀B∀C∀D∀E∀F Cong(A,B,C,D) ∧ Cong(C,D,E, F )
→ Cong(A,B,E, F )
T4 ∀A∀B Bet(A,B,A)→ A = B
T5 ∀A∀B∀C∀D∀E Bet(A,D,C) ∧Bet(B,E,C))
→ ∃F (Bet(D,F,B) ∧Bet(E,F,A)
T6 ∃E∀A∀B φ(A) ∧ ψ(B)→ Bet(E,A,B)
→ ∃F∀A∀B φ(A) ∧ ψ(B)→ Bet(A,F,B)
where φ and ψ are two arbitrary formulas of the language, containing no
free instances either E or F . Let there also be no free instances of A in
ψ(B) or of B in φ(A).
T7 ∃A∃B∃C ¬Bet(A,B,C) ∧ ¬Bet(B,C,A) ∧ ¬Bet(C,A,B)
T8 ∀A∀B∀C∀D∀E Cong(A,D,A,E) ∧ Cong(B,D,B,E)
∧Cong(C,D,C,E) ∧ ¬D = E
→ Bet(A,B,C) ∨Bet(B,C,A) ∨Bet(C,A,B)
T9 ∀A∀B∀C∀D∀E Bet(A,D,E) ∧Bet(B,D,C) ∧ ¬A = D
→ ∃F∃G Bet(A,B, F ) ∧Bet(A,C,G) ∧Bet(G,E, F )
T10 ∀A∀B∀C∀D∀E∀F∀G∀H ¬A = B ∧Bet(A,B,C) ∧Bet(E,F,G)
∧Cong(A,B,E, F ) ∧ Cong(B,C, F,G) ∧ Cong(A,D,E,H)
∧Cong(B,D,F,H)→ Cong(C,D,G,H)
T11 ∀A∀B∀C∀D∃E Bet(D,A,E) ∧ Cong(A,E,B,C)
The S′ semantics of the theory is defined as follows. The individuum variables
A,B,C, . . . will refer to the molecules of the paper. The predicate symbol Bet
corresponds to the Betweenness and the predicate symbol Cong corresponds to
the Congruence.
The physical theory (L′, S′) with the above semantics provides a proper
description of our empirical knowledge about the paper. For example, empirical
facts (E1) and (E2) are obviously represented by theorems in (L′, S′). This
theory equally well describes our empirical knowledge about the paper. It also
has the same predictive power. For instance, in L’ we can prove the following
theorem (Fig. 4):
1The reader may recognize that these are nothing but the well known Tarski–Givant (1999)
axioms of Euclidean geometry. But it must be emphasized that this fact is irrelevant.
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Theorem 1’.
∀A∀B∀G∀D∀E∀Z∃O Bet(A,D,B)
∧Bet(B,E,G) ∧Bet(G,Z,A) ∧ Cong(A,D,D,B)
∧Cong(B,E,E,G) ∧ Cong(G,Z,Z,A)
→ Bet(A,O,E) ∧Bet(B,O,Z) ∧Bet(G,O,D)
B
G
E
O
Z
D
A
Figure 4. The centroid of a triangle always exists.
With the above semantics, this leads us to the following hypothesis about the
molecules of the paper (Fig. 5):
HYPOTHESIS If molecules α, β, γ, δ, ε and ζ satisfy that δ is between α
and β, ε is between β and γ, and ζ is between γ and α, furthermore, α, δ are
congruent to δ, β, and β, ε are congruent to ε, γ, and γ, ζ are congruent to ζ, α,
then we can always find a molecule ω such that it is between α and ε, and it is
between β and ζ and it is between γ and δ.
β
γ
ε
ω
ζ
α
δ
Figure 5. According to the semantics of the theory, Theorem 1’. (Fig. 4) is a
statement about the molecules of the paper.
This hypothesis can be verified empirically by means of the scale-free ruler; and
we will find that the hypothesis is true.
Concluding remarks
• As we can see, we can indeed eliminate the quantifications over the math-
ematical entities from a physical theory. For example, in this “toy” phys-
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ical theory we eliminated the quantifications over the points of R2 and
the quantifications over the real numbers. This does not mean, however,
that we have really purified our physical theory from platonic objects: Al-
though we eliminated the quantifications over mathematical entities, we
did not eliminate the mathematical structures themselves. We still need
the structure defined by the axioms T1–T11. Thus, it seems unavoidable
to draw the conclusion that we ought to have ontological commitment to
formal systems as abstract entities; and this is well enough for the struc-
turalist version of platonism (Shapiro 1997).
• It must be noted that both the Quine–Putnam argument and Field’s crit-
icism are based on the tacit assumption that the terms and statements of
mathematics have meanings, and the only question is the ontological sta-
tus of the entities that mathematics refers to. According to the formalist
philosophy of mathematics, however, this assumption is unacceptable, ab
ovo.
• As we have seen in our example, both the platonistic and the nominalized
versions of the physical theory have the same structure: a meaningless
formal system + a partial semantics pointing only to physical, moreover,
observable things. From this point of view, it does not matter whether the
formal system in question contains quantifications over certain variables,
or not. Formal systems are obviously indispensable from both platonistic
and nominalized physical theories, in spite of the fact that they are mean-
ingless. The only question is: What is the ontological status of formal
systems? And still, one can answer this question from a structuralist–
platonist position, having supported by the Quine–Putnam indispensabil-
ity argument. Or, one can consider an entirely different account for formal
systems, which completely intact from the indispensability argument (see
for example Szabó’s (2003) physicalist ontology of formal systems).
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